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Abstract 
In this paper I clarify Wittgenstein’s position on meaning of life as exposed in Tractatus, and the 
related questions about the nonsensical and the ineffable. The problem is as follows: if there is a 
question that cannot be expressed, does it mean that there is no answer to it or rather that the 
answers are nonsensical? In order to address this issue, I develop my arguments in three parts: in the 
first step, I explain Wittgenstein’s thesis about the meaning of life as exposed in Tractatus, with an 
especial emphasis on the notions of nonsense and ineffability. In the second one, I go beyond 
Wittgenstein’s explanation in the Tractatus and refer to its two possible interpretations: the resolute 
and the illuminating ones, evaluating their plausibility and accuracy. Lastly, I provide some fictional 
examples in order to illustrate my explanation and to show, indirectly, what according to 
Wittgenstein cannot be said. 
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1. Meaning of life in the Tractatus 
 
In this section, I explain Wittgenstein’s conception of the “meaning of life” 
in his Tractatus, merely for expositive purposes. In his Tractatus 1 , first 
published in 1917, the Austrian philosopher stated that the questions about the 
meaning of life (among others, why do we exist? What is the point of being 
alive? Why are we here, alive, instead of dead?) cannot be formulated. The 
reason of this thesis is that the only kind of problems that human beings can 
define and solve are the problems of natural science (T4.11). These problems 
refer to physical facts, which are studied and solved by chemistry, biology... The 
main feature of answerable questions and their answers is that all of them are 
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measurable, quantitative and objective, contrastable by experience and common 
to all human being. 
However, and this is the main difficulty this inquiry faces, Wittgenstein also 
stated that even if all possible scientific questions were answered, the problems 
of life would have not been touched at all (T6.52). That is, scientific research 
can provide answers to problems such as the composition of a material, when 
and how the Earth became the Earth, when dinosaurs disappeared, decode the 
DNA and similar... However, no scientific investigation will answer 
metaphysical queries, questions related with our beliefs or our feelings, etc. For 
metaphysical questions are beyond science, they cannot be formulated or solved 
by any quantitative and measurable method. It is also possible that different 
human beings have different answers to these questions, so there is no an only 
and unique answer to them. Moreover, Wittgenstein stated they cannot be 
answered, because our language is insufficient to express them. Our scientific, 
objective and quantitative methods cannot grasp them either. These questions 
belong to what cannot be said: the ineffable. 
In order to understand properly Wittgenstein’s position on the ineffable, it is 
important to notice that according to the Tractatus the meaning of life is not the 
only question that cannot be formulated. In this category Wittgenstein also 
included the question about what a properly correct action is or the classic 
Kantian question concerning the existence of the World (LE, 6-8)2. There also 
pertain religious questions (on God’s existence, life after death; the reality of 
miracles and similar); ethical questions about the Good (what it is the absolute 
value, or the experience of feeling absolutely safe..., LE, p. 8); aesthetical 
questions (if there is absolute beauty...) and, in short, all the metaphysical issues, 
which ask about the meaning of “being”, “absolute”; or give a different, not 
every-day use, to terms such as “to be” or “good”. 
In another text, Wittgenstein summarised the main difficulty of such 
metaphysical questions with this explanation: 
 
“[…] As long as there is a verb 'to be' that looks as though it functions in 
the same way as ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’; as long as we still have the 
adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’; as long as we continue to 
talk of a ‘river of time’ and an ‘expanse of space’, etc., people will keep 
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stumbling over the same cryptic difficulties and staring at something that 
no explanation seems capable of clearing up” (CV, 22, MS 111 133: 
24.8.1931)3. 
 
There is a mistake then when we, human beings, understand and use the verb ‘to 
be’ as any other verb, or when we think that adjectives such as ‘identical’ or 
‘true’ are of the same kind as ‘red’ or ‘big’. The main problem of metaphysical 
questions is that they have a similar appearance to other questions, but are quite 
different and can neither be expressed by everyday language nor be solved with 
scientific methods. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the query about the 
meaning of life and all the aforementioned questions cannot be expressed or 
answered. 
It is not exaggerated to consider that, despite his two different periods, 
Wittgenstein tried to face the difficulties related to these metaphysical questions 
thorough his entire work. In order to avoid complexity and address one single 
topic, in this paper I will refer exclusively to the question of the meaning of life 
in Wittgenstein’s first period, that is, in the Tractatus. However, I would like to 
make clear that, although he defined a different approach to philosophy in his 
later period, these questions were still of his interest in his late work, as it is 
going to be mentioned in the final section of this paper.  
Another complexity of the early Wittgenstein’s arguments (which will be 
addressed below, especially in the second section) is that the Tractatus itself is 
composed by metaphysical questions, which are, therefore, ineffable and close 
to nonsense. That is, Wittgenstein’s first book is an example of these 
inexpressible questions that cannot be expressed or answered. However, I do not 
want to anticipate the problems of Wittgenstein’s argumentation before 
explaining it. 
As it has been already stated, according to the Tractatus, metaphysical 
questions are not problems of natural science, because they cannot be 
formulated or answered (T4.11). That is, the question about the meaning of life 
(and other philosophical questions related) cannot be formulated. Our words are 
not enough to express them and when we try to refer to them, we speak 
nonsense. 
The problem is then, and it is the main question of this paper, as follows: if 
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these questions cannot be expressed, does it mean that there is no answer to 
them? 
 
Not really, according to Wittgenstein, for when all scientific problems 
were solved, there would be no question left, and “just this is the answer” 
(T6.52). That is, Wittgenstein found the solution to the problem of life 
(and to the related metaphysical questions) in the vanishing of the 
problem itself (T6.521).  
 
According to his argumentation, the problem of life, and all our worries about it, 
simply disappears when we become aware that we cannot express or formulate it 
with our language. As human beings we experience and face this impossibility, 
especially when we try to refer with our words to the ineffable. In his “Lecture 
on Ethics”, Wittgenstein explained this impossibility with the following 
metaphor: it is like an absolutely hopelessly “running against the walls of our 
cage”. However, Wittgenstein also considered this impossible search as a 
tendency in the human mind, which he respected deeply and would never 
ridicule (LE 12).  
In other words: we face the impossibility of speaking about what cannot be 
said and, sometimes, we have lived or experienced this impossibility. For this 
same reason, Wittgenstein maintained that we can understand something that we 
cannot express (T6.521). Coming to this understanding and realising that we 
cannot speak about these topics is, according to this author, the only solution to 
this problem. 
Therefore, meaning of life cannot be expressed, it is what Wittgenstein calls 
“a mystical feeling” (T6.45), which cannot be said, just shown (T6.522). 
Moreover, whoever has understood this meaning cannot explain it (T6.521), 
cannot put it into understandable words. It is the ineffable. 
He gives yet another clue to understand this idea: the question about the 
meaning of life cannot be formulated in our language. Therefore, the riddle does 
not exist, because if a question cannot be formulated, it cannot be answered 
either (T6.51). As the meaning of life is a question that cannot be formulated, we 
just understand it when we accept that it is inexpressible. It is more a mystical 
feeling than a fact, it is (again) the ineffable. 
In a second step of his explanation, Wittgenstein proposes a method to 
elucidate this kind of metaphysical questions. The method is “to say nothing 
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except what can be said” and when someone wishes to say something 
metaphysical, demonstrate to him that he has given no meaning to certain signs 
in his propositions (T6.53).  
The Tractatus serves then as an elucidation of metaphysical problems: who 
understands this book, recognizes its aphorisms as “nonsense” (Unsinn). Then, 
he has surmounted these propositions and sees the World rightly. (T6.54). But at 
this point he cannot explain what he has understood; and if he dared to speak 
about it, his words would become nonsense.  
A terminological clarification to explain this argument properly4: in the 
Tractatus, “senseless” (Sinnlos) means something empty of meaning, 
meaningless or tautological (such as: ‘A=A’). It is the limit of logic and sense 
(T4.461). It is not understandable because there is nothing to understand. It has 
no content. On the other hand, “nonsense” (Unsinn) means absurd, a paradoxical 
content that is beyond the limits of the reasonable and understandable for human 
beings. While logical propositions are senseless, philosophical propositions and 
the queries on the meaning of the life are nonsensical (T4.0031). Once someone 
has understood that philosophical contents and the questions about the meaning 
of life are nonsensical contents that are limited by the empty bounds of logic, he 
can finally avoid referring to these nonsensical topics and sees the World rightly 
(T6.54). He has, Wittgenstein says, thrown the ladder away and then there are 
neither answers, nor questions, just silence (T7).  
Wittgenstein’s conclusion (if it can be called this way) about the question of 
life is then that the solution of the problem is its sheer vanishing (T6.521). The 
problem disappears when one acknowledges that it is absurd. It is a question that 
cannot be expressed in our language, so there is neither question nor answer. The 
only way of facing this problem is not to speak about it, become silent. It is 
precisely the last aphorism of the Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof 
one must be silent” (T7). 
 
2. Two possible interpretations of Wittgensteinian theses and of the notion 
of “nonsense” 
 
After explaining Wittgenstein’s position about the meaning of life in the 
Tractatus, I would like to ask how we can understand this position and if it is 
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consistent or even, satisfactory. We need to raise this problem in order to face 
similar situations to those posed by Eagleton (2007:36-37): if someone has an 
existential crisis and queries about the meaning of his life, a look-up in a 
dictionary for some meaning will not help him at all. In a similar way, I would 
like to consider whether it would be helpful to explain Wittgenstein’s critique to 
philosophical questions to someone who has an existential crisis or to apply the 
method proposed in the Tractatus to solve their existential doubts. That is, what 
if we tell to the sufferer that their doubts are absurd, because they are not 
expressible? What if we tell them that the only solution to their concerns is not 
to formulate these questions, to avoid them, to become silent? 
In order to answer these questions and solve (if possible) this difficulty, I 
would like to point out that Wittgenstein’s work is aphoristic, fragmentary and 
difficult to understand. There is not a unified and clear interpretation of his work, 
but rather different trends, sometimes opposed. Similarly, his critique to the 
meaning of the life in the Tractatus is complex and controversial. It has not been 
unanimously understood and is open to manifold interpretations, which give 
different answers to the raised question. Thus, in the following subsections, I 
analyse two different ways of interpreting Wittgenstein’s position on the 
question of life in the Tractatus: namely, the resolute and the illuminating ones. 
Each of them understands differently what “nonsense” means and gives 
divergent answers to the aforementioned questions. 
 
2.1 The resolute answer to the question of meaning of life 
 
One of the most recent and controversial ways of understanding the 
Tractarian critique to the meaning of life is the resolute reading, proposed by 
James Conant and Cora Diamond, among other authors. They understand 
Wittgenstein’s solution to the meaning of the life (and all the related 
metaphysical questions) in a radical way and propose to eliminate these 
questions: 
According to Conant, the primary characteristic of the resolute reading of 
the Tractatus is the rejection of the idea that this book has something that 
requires being grasped and applied by the reader, a method or a way of living 
according to some content… (2006:173-174. Italics by Conant). This author also 
rejects the idea that the sentences of the Tractatus content a theory that specifies 
the conditions under which some sentences or actions make sense or not. Quite 
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the opposite, the resolute readers reject the idea that Wittgenstein aimed to put 
forward substantive theories, doctrines or concepts in his work. The kind of 
philosophy that Wittgenstein sought to practice not consisted in putting forward 
theories, but in an activity of elucidation and dissolution of philosophical 
concepts and existential doubts. These doubts are dissolved when the reader of 
the Tractatus understands them as nonsensical and discards them (Conant, ib.). 
The Tractatus itself, all the content and related metaphysical questions are 
thus, according to Conant, just plain nonsense. They mean nothing, are purely 
absurd and have to be dissolved (2006:176). Therefore, it is not possible to add 
anything else after Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophical questions. We cannot 
say anything about the meaning of life. There is not answer to this question, the 
only valid approach to it is its dissolution.  
In this sense, the Tractatus is committed “just to a piecemeal approach to 
solving philosophical problems”, which consists in showing that those 
metaphysical contents, which seemed to be profound and somehow 
“life-guiding”, were, in fact, mere nonsense (Conant, 2011:626). The only 
possible way of understanding this book is to become aware that the first “state 
of understanding” of the book was only apparent (Conant, 2011:628). There is 
nothing to understand, think or apply after reading this book, just pieces of 
nonsense that must be dissolved. 
A clarification may be required to understand this position properly: for the 
resolute readers the term “nonsense” just denotes a critique and a way of naming 
a sort of illusion, namely, the one that is generated through the inability of 
speakers to understand their own lack of understanding. In the first and wrong 
reading of the Tractatus, the confused reader did not have a clear view about 
what he was doing with these words. Apparently, he seemed to understand 
something, but actually he did not understand it, because there was nothing to 
understand (2011:630). Once he has acknowledged this nonsense and the 
illusion is manifest, there is nothing more to understand or speak about. The 
content has shown to be nonsensical, then the problem has been solved and there 
is just silence. 
In a similar vein, Cora Diamond explains the way of getting rid of the 
illusion of understanding the Tractatus, and subsequently, the way of becoming 
aware about the nonsense that entails all the questions about the meaning of life. 
In proposing this, she follows the aphorism 6.54 of the Tractats, which I quote: 
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“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me 
finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through 
them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, 
after he has climbed up on it.) 
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly” 
(T6.54) 
 
According to Diamond, a resolute reading of the Tractatus implies “to throw the 
ladder away”. That is, to throw away any “attempt to take seriously the language 
of 'features of reality'” or even to understand terms such as “meaning” or 
“sense” in a substantive and referential way (1988:7). Diamond maintains that 
reading Wittgenstein’s work resolutely requires a serious commitment to 
“not-chickening-out” with our language. Moreover, according to Diamond, 
Wittgenstein never asserted that there are features of reality that cannot be put 
into words, but shown. There is nothing mystical or profound in the Tractatus, 
there is nothing like some “sort of mysterious kind of meaning” that cannot be 
said, but just shown. Quite the opposite, in this book there is just confusion and 
nonsense (1988:7). 
Diamond admits that sometimes it may be useful, or even necessary, to 
speak about the meaning of life, or to look for a mystical approach to our 
concerns (for example, in faith or looking for a religious relief to a personal 
crisis…). Notwithstanding, she also maintains that these contents are not present 
in the Tractatus at all. That is, if we accept the resolute understanding of the 
Tractatus, the content (if can be called so) of the book has to be let go of and 
honestly taken to be what they really is: “a real, plain nonsense”. (Diamond, 
1988:8). 
In conclusion, according to Conant and Diamond, speaking about 
metaphysical questions or about the meaning of life after the Tractatus turns out 
to become a real, plain nonsense. We cannot speak about these topics and 
pretend to make sense. And, which is more important to the topic of this paper, 
we cannot pretend that there are solutions to our vital and existential queries in 
Wittgenstein’s work. Maybe someone can find answers to these queries in the 
faith or in other branches of the philosophy, but never in the Tractatus, which is 




2.2 The illuminating answer to the question of the meaning of life 
 
An alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein’s critique to meaning in the 
Tractatus can be found in Peter Hacker’s Illusion and Insight (1986/1997). 
Some authors, for example Conant who criticises deeply Hacker’s thesis, call 
this interpretation the “standard view” (Conant, 2006:174). I will call it the 
“illuminating view”, due to its content. 
According to Hacker, in a first reading, the Tractarian solution to the riddle 
of life is unconvincing and even annoying. Remaining silent about what cannot 
be said is not enough to solve philosophical questions, even less when these 
questions are not only theoretical, but linked to existential doubts and vital 
concerns. For this very reason, for the dissatisfaction that this first reading of 
Tractatus causes (on a theoretical and also on a vital level), Hacker maintains 
that this unconvincing solution means something, which he calls an 
“illuminating nonsense” (1986:18).  
In opposition to the “plain nonsense”, which resolute readers find in the 
Tractatus, Hacker distinguishes between two different kinds of nonsense: the 
misleading and the illuminating ones. Moreover, he addresses a severe critique 
−also inspired in the Tractatus− to the philosophy in its traditional sense and to 
the resolute readers, as well.  
Hacker accepts and follows the Tractarian delimitation about what can be 
said and not. However, he does not stop at the moment of silence, apparently 
established in the seventh aphorism of the book, but tries another approach in an 
attempt to grasp the ineffable. According to Hacker, philosophy is not enough to 
understand ourselves and our lives. The solution of the riddle of life cannot be 
found just in philosophy: a mere theoretical, philosophical answer to our queries 
will be empty or nonsensical (1986:21). Following the Tractatus, Hacker 
criticises the conception of philosophy as a discipline that provides knowledge 
about “the essential, metaphysical, nature of the world” (1986:14). If someone 
tried to say something meaningful about metaphysical topics from a 
philosophical perspective, he would be incoherent and his words would become 
nonsensical. In other words, if we accept the Tractarian critique to metaphysics 
and its delimitation of sense, we also have to accept that any attempt to describe 
the essence of things will violate boundaries of sense, misuse language and will 
be nonsensical. (1986:21). 
This is the misleading nonsense that appears, according to Hacker’s 
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interpretation of the Tractatus, when philosophers try to express what just can be 
shown (1986:19). Examples encompass theological proofs to demonstrate the 
existence of God, philosophical theories about the Good, the Beauty or any 
attempt at defining meaningful thesis about the meaning of life, as it was 
explained in the first section of the present paper. However, according to Hacker, 
the Tractarian critique to philosophical and existential questions does not mean 
that there is no sense or no possibility of understanding the ineffable. Hacker 
finds here the second notion if nonsense: the illuminating one.  
According to Hacker, when we acknowledge the nonsense that appears in 
philosophy, also appears some light, under which we understand something. 
This is what he calls an “illuminating nonsense”. It is illuminating because it 
guides the attentive reader to apprehend what was shown by nonsensical 
propositions. We only understand it indirectly and incompletely (1986:18).  
Hacker accepts that Wittgenstein never used the expression “illuminating 
nonsense”. What the Austrian philosopher said, as it has been already explained, 
was that the propositions of the Tractatus elucidate something, when they are 
understood as nonsensical. They are pseudo-propositions over which one can 
climb in order to see the World aright. When one has realised that these 
propositions are nonsensical and has thrown away the ladder, one would be, so 
to say, “illuminated”. He has thus acquired another perspective about philosophy 
and the World (1986:26). In this sense, Hacker maintains that the Tractatus 
presents nonsensical pseudo-propositions that bring some light to the reader and 
make some sense about the ineffable and nonsensical (1986:25). 
There is then something beyond philosophy and beyond Tractatus, which 
has a strange and unclear sense. It cannot be said it in proper words, just 
illuminated or reflected by nonsense.  
There are some additional texts of the early Wittgenstein that support 
Hacker’s idea of “illuminating nonsense”. In the preface of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein wrote that this book “will draw a limit to the expression of 
thoughts”. However, in order to draw such limit, “we should have to be able to 
think both sides of this limit”, that is, “we should have to be able to think what 
cannot be thought”. This limit can be drawn only in language and “what lies on 
the other side of the limit will be nonsense” (T, p.3). Wittgenstein also wrote in a 
letter to Ficker, the editor of the Tractatus, that this book “consists of two parts: 
the one presented here, plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this 
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second part that is the important one”5. 
Thus, according to Wittgenstein, there is something beyond the boundaries 
established by language and logic. We can think about it, without being able to 
express it properly. It is certainly nonsensical and inexpressible. 
Notwithstanding, this is the most important part of the Tractatus, the one that 
cannot be said. 
Following these texts, Hacker coins the expression “illuminating nonsense”. 
He maintains that, although we speak nonsense when we try to grasp meaning of 
the ineffable (for example, when we try to say something about the meaning of 
life), and although these nonsenses say nothing about the World, they do reveal 
or show certain qualities of logic and reality, which cannot be expressed in any 
other way. He also calls it a “meaningless nonsense”, in reference to 
propositions that do not say anything but show some unsayable content 
(1997:16). Using another metaphor, Hacker explains that the “nonsensical 
sentences of the Tractatus manage to echo or whistle the metaphysical melody 
of what cannot be uttered for an insightful reader”. These sentences are 
categorised as “illuminating nonsenses” and, despite being nonsensical sensu 
stricto, are nevertheless able to convey insights into the hidden nature of reality 
and ourselves (Hacker, 1997:18). 
There are, then, some contents (maybe not contents; but echoes, whistles or 
mirror reflections) that resound in Wittgenstein’s critique to philosophical 
meaning in the Tractatus. We cannot address these weird contents directly, as 
our words fail in this task and become nonsensical; but we can express or show 
them in a different, not verbal or logical way, which is close to absurd. 
Questions about the meaning of life, and the nonsense that they entail, can be 
placed in this complicated and absurd field.  
 
2.3 Comparison and closing remarks 
 
I have explained two interpretations regarding the notion of “nonsense” in 
Tractatus and their related answers to the query about the meaning of life. 
According to the resolute readers, this question cannot be formulated properly 
and correctly from the Tractarian perspective. It is possible to obtain answers to 
this query from other fields, but certainly not in the Tractatus. Any pretension of 
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finding a solution to the riddle of life in this book will only bring nonsense and 
misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s work. On the contrary, according to Hacker, 
there are two different kinds of nonsense: the explicit and misleading one, which 
emerges when we try to speak about what cannot be said; and the indirect, 
illuminating or meaningless one, which appears beyond the limits of the 
understandable and expressible. The second one can be just whistled or reflected, 
not expressed by meaningful words. 
A necessary clarification is required to frame this comparison and make my 
point clear: I do not consider that resolute readers are wrong in their 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s work. I accept that on the hermeneutic level 
(where Wittgenstein’s work is interpreted to the letter) the resolute theses are 
correct, solid and well argued. I also accept that the resolute readers are more 
interested in philosophical and theoretical debates (the meaning of meaning) 
than in existential or vital crises (the meaning of our lives). However, if we 
accept that the questions about the meaning of life are not just merely theoretical, 
but vital and existential concerns, I find Hacker’s answer more accurate and 
satisfactory rather than the resolute one, for the three following reasons: 
The first one is a biographical reason: it is possible to ask why Wittgenstein 
kept writing about philosophy and meaning of life, even though he stated in the 
Tractatus that the solution to the riddle of life was to become silent. That is, he 
wrote the Tractatus in 1917. Then, he abandoned philosophy, became a school 
teacher and a gardener, and after some existential crises, he came back to 
philosophy with a pluralistic approach to language, related to human practices 
(Monk, 1990:191ff.). Afterwards, he kept writing about philosophy until few 
days before his death. Thus, his own solution to the riddle of life was not the 
silence, but trying to say something unsayable, in a different way; trying to 
articulate some (non)sense that cannot be said, but shown somehow.  
It is also relevant to remind that in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein did not say 
that there is no sense, but that it cannot be expressed, just shown (T4.1212). As 
it has also been quoted above, in his “Lecture on Ethics”, he identified the 
search of an absolute good as an impossible, though respectable, search; which 
runs against the boundaries of language. In essence, it is nonsensical, but it is 
also unavoidable for any human being who tries to think about ethics or religion 
(LE, pp.11-12). Moreover, in his later work, he wrote that “the results of 
philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of 
bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of 
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language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery” (PI 119)6. In 
1938, he gave lectures on religion in Cambridge, in which he stated that 
religious believes do not rest on historic, logic or rational basis in the same sense 
as ordinary believes. Religious believes are neither reasonable, nor unreasonable. 
These believes cannot be treated as a matter of reasonability, because they 
belong to a completely different field, which is beyond history, science or 
rationality. However, it does not mean that they do not exist or are false, because 
they articulate and give meaning to the life of believers (LRB, 57-58)7. To sum 
up: in his entire life Wittgenstein tried to grasp something about what cannot be 
properly said and some of his later work and thoughts are addressed to try to 
clarify these topics. However, resolute readers barely take into account this part 
of Wittgenstein’s work and focus primarily in the Tractatus. 
The second reason is linguistic and philosophical: in their resolute 
interpretation of the Tractatus, Conant and Diamond understand language as 
completely referential, as if the only valid use of language were the scientific 
one, according to which words refer to things and nothing else can be said. This 
understanding is similar to the positivist conception of language proposed by the 
members of the Circle of Vienna, who were pursuing a distinction between the 
correct and veritable expression of reality and all the misuses of language that 
only bring confusion8. The logical atomism present in the intermediate sections 
of the Tractatus seemed to fit perfectly in this referential understanding of 
language. Therefore, the members of the Vienna Circle proposed a positivist 
interpretation of the Tractatus, according to which the verifiable sentences of 
natural science are the only valid sentences and the only possible truth9. 
However, in order to maintain this interpretation of the Tractatus, the members 
of the Vienna Circle (and the resolute readers as well) have to focus just on the 
picture theory of language proposed in the first four sections of the book and 
disregard the final parts, especially the aphorisms after the 5.6, where logic is 
defined as the boundary of the expressible and there are references to the tasks 
                                                     
6 The Philosophical Investigations are quoted as PI, followed by aphorism. 
7 The “Lectures on Religious Belief” are quoted as LRB, followed by number of page. 
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Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle”, published in Neurath (1973: 299-318) (There are also 
several editions of the Manifesto available online.) 
9 For this interpretation, see Hahn, “Empirismus, Mathematik, und Logik”. He was a member of the 
Vienna Circle and one of the first readers of the Tractatus. See also Carnap “Über Protokollsätze”, 
where he identifies the elementary observation sentences with the verifiable sentences of the 
Tractatus. 
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of philosophy, the ineffable and the mystical. All these contents seemed to be 
purely nonsensical and not so relevant to these interpreters. Moreover, Moritz 
Schlick (the leader of the Vienna Circle) was constantly inviting Wittgenstein to 
share the Tractatus with them, although Wittgenstein rejected all the invitations. 
Finally, he accepted to join them in some discussions, however, most times he 
did not wanted to speak about logic or philosophy; he would rather read poetry 
to the astonished logicians (see Monk, 1990:242ff.).  
Beyond the anecdotes and the philosophical debates, it is worth taking into 
account that in our everyday use of language there are more uses than the 
scientific or referential one. That is, we speak with metaphors, irony, jokes; there 
is poetry, absurd expressions and meaningful ellipsis. We understand them, they 
belong to our way of expressing ourselves and they cannot be just eliminated or 
disregarded, in order to propose a strict positivist and referential use of language. 
The consideration that the only valid use language is the scientific, referential 
one is not enough to give an account of how we, human beings, are and 
communicate. This referential conception is a strict and merely theoretical 
understanding of language, which does not take into account that in our lives 
there are much more uses of language, which are not strictly referential. These 
uses might not have a real reference in the World, might be confuse and absurd; 
however, they are part of our lives, we use and (somehow) understand them; and 
philosophers should take them into account as well. Most members of the 
Vienna Circle, nevertheless, as well as some resolute readers, do not seem to 
accept this fact and understand language in its strictly referential use10. 
The third reason has already been mentioned: it is the emotional or 
psychological one, related to the painful reality of existential crises. As Eagleton 
maintains, if someone asks about the meaning of his life, he is not asking about 
any concept or theory, but about certain vital unease; in this sense, he does not 
need logical clarification but solace, and probably he is more likely to reach for 
suicide pills than for a dictionary (2007:38). If we accept this, the resolute 
solution is not enough to face real and vital crises. That is, if someone has an 
existential crisis and wants to end up with his life, would it be useful to tell him 
that his queries are plain nonsense and have to be dissolved in order to see the 
                                                     
10 It is not my intention to generalise and apply my critique to all positivist and resolute readers. I 
understand that there are different authors in both trends, nuances in their theories and their views on 
language have varied thorough time. My critique goes against the strictly referential understanding of 
Tractatus which is present in Conant’s and Diamond’s work, analysed in this paper, and the authors of 
the Vienna Circle mentioned in footnotes 9 and 10. 
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World rightly and not formulate these doubts never again? 
It is also possible to argue that the resolute solution to existential crises is 
just located on a theoretical and abstract level, quite far away from our real and 
actual concerns. The resolute authors do not seem to understand that there is 
unawareness that cannot be expressed properly with words, but that really does 
harm. This fact (a pain that cannot be said but hurts) can be explained better by 
Hacker’s “illuminating nonsense” than by Conant’s and Diamond’s “plain 
nonsense”. For this reason I find Hacker’s answer to the meaning of life more 
accurate than the resolute one. 
I would like to make a final consideration, linked to the third reason and to 
something that can be called the “social consideration of philosophy”. When 
resolute readers understand philosophy as a merely theoretical and conceptual 
discipline and they develop their arguments on this abstract level; they also 
isolate philosophy from human lives and prevent this discipline from being 
linked to everyday concerns. This strict and abstract comprehension of 
philosophy does not allow to think the real problems, difficulties and concerns 
that worry us in our daily lives. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the 
resolute reading is a sterile and alienated understanding of philosophy, quite 
academic and deep, but quite different as well to the living philosophy that 
Socrates put into practice in the agora.  
There is, then, a barrier among the academic philosophy and the everyday 
concerns. For this same reason, philosophy is often criticised for being useless 
or proposing abstract and sterile theories, far away from our daily life. This 
critique is not just a debate among philosophers and non-philosophers, but has 
impact on philosophers’ work (for example, teaching) and for the future of the 
discipline. For example, if philosophy is understood as a useless and empty 
discipline, not related to our lives, it is more likely that legislators decide that it 
should not be taught in schools, as there is no reason to do it. Quite the opposite, 
the considerations about the meaning of life presented in this paper can serve as 
an example of “utility” of philosophy and “connection” of this discipline to 
some human concerns. So what is offered here is an answer to the question 
about why it is important to study and teach philosophy. It is my intention, then, 
to propose a real and living understanding of philosophy, following Socrates, 
and other philosophers who wanted to discuss philosophical questions on the 
street with everyone. The philosophical enterprise could be then characterized, 
Wittgenstein dixit, in the following way: “What we [philosophers] do is to bring 
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words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (PI 116). 
After this consideration, in the final part of the article, I will give some 
examples of answers to the query of life, which are nonsensical, and possibly 
absurd, but at the same time they are useful to express something that, strictly 
speaking, cannot be expressed. These fictional examples bring some light to the 
topic of this paper, serve as illustrations of Hacker’s concept of “illuminating 
nonsense” and, indirectly, give some (weird) answers to the query about the 
meaning of our lives. 
 
3. Showing what cannot be said: some fictional examples  
 
To close this article, I would like to propose that some fictional contents can 
serve as examples that show what cannot be said and this also can illuminate, 
indirectly, the Tractarian ineffable answer to the query of life. At the same time, 
they can bring some (strange) light to our queries and doubts about the meaning 
of life. These examples come from science-fiction stories where the question 
about the meaning of life is asked and answered in an almost unintelligible way.  
The first example is The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, by the British 
writer Douglas Adam11; the second one is The Left Hand of the Darkness, by the 
USA writer Ursula K. LeGuin. These two examples are unconventional and 
surprising answers to the question about the meaning of life that show, with a 
different tone, something related to what has been argued in this paper. 
In Adams’ example, there is a computer, called Deep Thought, which was 
processed to have all the answers of “Life, the Universe and Everything” 
(2000:113). When some wise men and women asked Deep Thought about the 
meaning of life, the computer said that there was an answer, but he needed some 
time to process it (2000:115). Seven and half million years later, Deep Thought 
finally had the answer and it was ‘42’ (2000:120). When the wise men and 
women refused it and said that ‘42’ was a nonsensical answer, the computer 
responded that if human beings were dissatisfied with that answer it was because, 
actually, they did not known what the question was (2000:122).  
In LeGuin’s case, Genry, the narrator (an explorer with a complicated 
diplomatic mission in a strange World) goes to Oderhord, a region of foretellers, 
in search for some answers about his mission. One of the foretellers, Faxe, 
                                                     
11 Eagleton also mentions this example in his book about the meaning of life (on the 42th page!) (See 
Eagleton, 2007:42ff.) 
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explains him how to formulate prophetic questions: “The more qualified and 
limited the question, the more exact the answer. Vagueness breeds vagueness” 
(1969:32). Faxe also tells Genry that some questions are not answerable and 
cannot be formulated because they wreck the humans. He gives an example: 
Lord of Shorth forced the Foretellers to answer the question about the meaning 
of life. In an effort to answer it, the Foretellers stayed in the darkness for six 
days and nights. At the end, “all the Celibates were catatonic, the Zanies were 
dead, the Pervert clubbed the Lord of Shorth to death with a stone” (ib.). 
It does not mean, Faxe follows his explanation, that questions such as the 
meaning of life do not have answer, but that knowing the answer brings 
craziness and wreck to humankind, so it is better not to ask them. The reason of 
this ban is that the unknown is what life is based on. In Faxe’s words: “The only 
thing that makes life possible is permanent, intolerable uncertainty” (1969:37). 
That is the only liveable answer. Any other answer would carry craziness, 
violence and death (that is, not life) to humankind. 
To close my explanation and link previous examples to the theses presented 
in this paper, I would like to point out that these two weird answers to the 
question of the meaning of life are quite Wittgensteinian, in a broad sense. 
Deep Thought’s solution to the riddle of life is Wittgensteinian because the 
computer recommends the confused human beings to clarify themselves and 
their ideas, before asking unsolvable and confuse questions. This is one of the 
methods that the later Wittgenstein proposed in his Philosophical Investigations 
with a view to avoiding philosophical misunderstandings: the “grammatical 
investigation” or “analysis”:  
 
“Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation 
sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. 
Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other 
things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different 
regions of language.—Some of them can be removed by substituting one 
form of expression for another; this may be called an ‘analysis’ of our 
forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a 
thing apart” (PI 90) 
 
Then, according to Wittgenstein and to Deep Thought, in order to have real 
answers, it is necessary to clarify questions first. Otherwise, everything will be 
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confuse and unclear. 
With regard to LeGuin’s case: the answer to the riddle of life is that we 
cannot know everything because life is based on uncertainty. To be alive is to 
accept that we cannot know everything. Even though all the questions were 
solved, we would not know everything. The idea echoes almost perfectly the 
statement of the aforementioned aphorism 6.52 of Tractatus: “[...] if all possible 
scientific questions [are] answered, the problems of life have still not been 
touched at all” (T6.52).  
It does not mean that these problems do not exist or that they unanswerable, 
it is just that we cannot express them. That is not possible, because there are 
ineffable realities in our lives that we cannot grasp with our words and thoughts. 
On the contrary, asking and trying to know some things, such as the meaning of 
life, will bring craziness and death to the humankind. And “just that is the 
answer” (T6.52, again).  
Therefore, Faxe’s recommendations to avoid answering problematic 
questions that would bring craziness are similar to the following aphorisms of 
Tractatus:  
 
“The temporal immortality of the soul of man, that is to say, its eternal 
survival also after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this 
assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to 
make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive forever? Is this 
eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the 
riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. 
(It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.)” 
(T6.4312) 
 
“The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this 
problem. 
(Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of 
life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)” 
(T.6521) 
 




There is then a boundary (present in Tractatus and in Faxe’s considerations 
about the queries about life) that separates what can be known and what cannot 
be known. It is also present in the differences among what can be said and what 
can be shown, and in the differences among the scientific approach to 
knowledge and the mystical attitude. The second dimension, which is beyond 
the limit of the expressible, is present in our lives in a different and strange way. 
There are risks if we try to understand this dimension. The ineffable and the 
mystical field is beyond logic and can entail craziness. However, this is a 
dimension present in our lives. 
Therefore, there are answers to the questions of the meaning of life; 
however they cannot be expressed, just shown indirectly by nonsenses, or by 
what Hacker calls “illuminating nonsenses”, such as those I have presented, 
following Adams’ and LeGuin’s examples.  
A final consideration is required to close my argumentation: science-fiction 
is not the only way of trying to show what cannot be said. There are many 
different ways of trying to grasp that. For example, Hacker refers to singing or 
whistling (1997:18). The “only” requisites to access to this nonsensical field are 
to overcome the aforementioned scientific and positivist comprehension of 
language and to be open to other possible expressions of reality. It is possible to 
reach some sense and unexpected answers to the queries of our lives with 
abstract art, creativity, humour, absurd, poetry..., more efficiently than with deep 
and abstract philosophical thoughts. 
And Wittgenstein was also aware about his possibility when in his lecture on 
aesthetics he stated that:  
 
“The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an 
aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by 
experience or by statistics as to how people react […] e.g. you can try 
out a piece of music in a psychological laboratory and get the result that 
the music acts in such and such a way under such and such a drug. This 
is not what one means or what one is driving at by an investigation into 
aesthetics.” (LAE, III, 11, p. 21)12 
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